Sus taina ble Gr ow th R ate
The SGR is a formula that determines annual updates in the MPFS conversion factor by adding to or subtracting from the trend in the Medicare Economic Index, which reflects the costs of medical practice. The SGR attempts to control aggregate Medicare spending on physician services by adjusting the conversion factor on the basis of previous trends in the utilization of services as compared with a benchmark. However, since the SGR sets changes in payment rates for all physicians, regardless of whether their use or mix of services has increased or decreased, it does not change incentives for individual physicians. Since 2002, rate reductions prescribed by the formula have been deferred because of policymakers' fears of compromising the access of beneficiaries to physician services. Instead of allowing the rate reductions, Congress has either frozen rates or approved slight increases well below the Medicare Economic Index increases, resulting in substantial erosion in the adequacy of physician-payment rates over time.
Linking Medicare payment rate increases to previous trends in the utilization of physician services ( Fig. 1 ) goes back to the initiation of the MPFS in 1992 and reflects the aim of policymakers to have more control over spending. However, budget legislation in 1997 created the more stringent SGR formula, which allowed smaller utilization increases and tied the formula to the ups and downs of the broader economy. The SGR resulted in annual updates to the fee schedule at or above the Medicare Economic Index until 2002, when a 4.8% reduction occurred, setting the stage for Congress to repeatedly block subsequent sharp rate reductions.
When the SGR formula called for another large decrease in rates in 2003, Congress blocked the cut. However, to limit the increase in projected outlays over future years, the rate relief applied for only 1 year, compounding the magnitude of the next scheduled rate cut.
This process, which frustrates both physicians and policymakers, has continued without a solution in sight. In late November 2010, Congress deferred the 23% cut scheduled for December 1, 2010, but only for 1 month. If no subsequent action is taken before the end of the year, a cut of 24.9% will be effective on January 1, 2011. 1 Congress clearly does not want large rate cuts to go into effect, but it also does not want to take responsibility for the large increases in projected spending -approximately $330 billion over 10 years, according to an April 2010 Congressional Budget Office estimate -resulting from termi-health policy report nating the SGR. 2 Indeed, some view the SGR history as an ongoing budget gimmick that permits a large understatement of future federal obligations.
In early 2008, I wrote that short-term steps to defer rate cuts under the SGR would continue until a permanent resolution could be combined with comprehensive Medicare provider-payment reform. 3 This combination would allow Congress to justify the higher projected spending by crafting a long-term solution to the problem of rising costs. Health reform might have been an opportunity for such a step because of the extensive array of provider-payment reforms that were included, as discussed below.
However, the highly charged politics of health reform and the increasing concern about budget deficits precluded a permanent fix. With Democrats including a permanent SGR fix in a companion to the House reform bill to court physician support for health reform, Republican support evaporated. The fact that it was not "paid for" with spending cuts and tax increases led some members of Congress who support a permanent SGR resolution to oppose the legislation. At this point, Congress probably will continue to enact short-term fixes until it addresses the long-run budget situation comprehensively, perhaps not until 2013, after the next presidential election.
Medic are Physician Fee Sched ule
The phase-in period for the MPFS began in 1992. Payment rates are based on the RBRVS, with separate components for physician work, practice expenses and malpractice expenses, geographic adjusters, and a factor that converts relative values to dollars. The law directed what is today the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) to update relative work values at least every 5 years.
During the second 5-year update, which was implemented in 2002, approximately 900 Current Procedural Terminology codes that mostly involved surgical procedures were identified as being improperly valued. Of these, approximately 750 were reviewed by the Relative Value Update Committee of the American Medical Association. This review resulted in recommendations to increase the values of 477 services and reduce the values of 28. Only 0.5% of the dollars were redistributed, according to the CMS. After this update, concerns began to surface that the update process, which revolved around those codes proposed by specialty societies for review, was leading to an undeserved deterioration of the incomes of primary care physicians. 4 Services with increases in either physician productivity or facility productivity should have had reductions in relative values, but those who delivered the services and had the best knowledge of productivity had no incentive to bring them forward. When coupled with severe resource limitations, shortcomings in the update process appeared to result in distortions in the payment structure similar to those that led to legislation that created the MPFS in 1989.
However, the mid-2000s appeared to have been a turning point for attempts to increase the accuracy of the RBRVS. The third 5-year review of relative work values in 2007 reflected the first attempt to grapple with the issue of low payments to primary care physicians. The Relative Value Update Committee addressed this issue and recommended higher work values for evaluation and management services on the basis of increased complexity over time. The CMS accepted these recommendations, but because of budget-neutrality requirements and only small changes in practice-expense relative values for these services, the 20% increase in the work value led to increases of only 6.5% in payment rates for evaluation and management services. 5 The MPFS for 2007 also included important changes in practice-expense relative values. The most notable difference involved a change in the method of calculating relative values from a "topdown" approach to a "bottom-up" approach. Instead of calculating the direct practice-expense relative values by starting with survey data on aggregate practice expenses in each specialty, the CMS began by calculating the direct costs of specific procedures based on the inputs of clinical labor, equipment, and supplies that were identified by "clinical-practice expert panels." The results were refined by various advisory committees. At the specialty level, the bottom-up approach tended to benefit office-based specialties at the expense of hospital-based specialties.
Larger changes in practice-expense relative values occurred in 2010, when a new survey of physician practices was incorporated into the calculations of relative values. Because of a lack of funding to conduct surveys to recalculate practiceexpense relative values, Congress directed the CMS in 1999 to use surveys conducted by specialty societies that met certain standards. Specialty societies that believed that their practice expenses had increased substantially -and which had the re- sources to do so -contracted for surveys of their members, but others did not, meaning that substantial inconsistencies (e.g., different methods and the length of time since the data were collected) were introduced into the RBRVS. The American Medical Association and many specialty societies jointly sponsored a broad survey of all specialty and nonphysician practitioners in 2007 and 2008. This Physician Practice Information Survey replaced the older survey data for practice-expense relative values for the 2010 MPFS. As a result of much more current data and the return to consistency, albeit sometimes with small sample sizes, effects on some specialties were substantial. Cardiology and radiology had considerable payment reductions, whereas primary care specialties gained.
Payment for the technical component of imaging services has received a great deal of policy attention. Legislation in 2005 resulted in 25% reductions in payments for multiple procedures linked to specific groups of imaging codes in 2006. In 2007, the CMS implemented a separate provision of the legislation that placed a cap on MPFS payment for the technical component of imaging services at the rate paid to hospital outpatient departments. Although, on average, payment rates for hospital outpatient departments are higher than those for other facilities where imaging is performed, there are enough services for which this is not the case that a Government Accountability Office analysis showed an important effect on spending. 6 An additional reduction in rates for magnetic resonance imaging and computed tomography in 2010 resulted from a change in the assumption of equipment utilization -from 50% to 75%.
Reports from the Medicare Payment Advisory Commission and from some independent analysts have focused policymakers on the need for a broader effort to identify and review codes that are potentially overvalued. The CMS acknowledged the issue, discussing it in its 2009 and 2010 MPFS rules. Although such an effort is within the longstanding authority of the CMS, the ACA probably will increase the speed and scope of such a review by mandating that the CMS undertake it. Indeed, the legislation included specific directions concerning codes to review, including those for which there has been the fastest growth in volume, those that have been associated with substantial changes in practice expense, and those recently established for new procedures that had not been reviewed since the implementation of the MPFS.
Notwithstanding its push to increase attention to updating the RBRVS, in the ACA, Congress departed from a pure resource-based approach to consider programmatic goals by including a 5-year incentive program to increase access for primary care services and general surgery services. For 5 years, beginning in 2011, primary care practitioners (both physicians and nonphysician practitioners) will receive a 10% increase in payment for primary care services provided to Medicare beneficiaries. General surgeons practicing in Health Professional Shortage Areas will receive a 10% increase in payment rates for major surgical procedures. These changes are independent of revisions to the RBRVS.
Perhaps the most dramatic change in payment for primary care is in the Medicaid program. In 2013 and 2014, Medicaid programs will pay primary care physicians for primary care services at Medicare rates, with the federal government funding the entire difference between Medicare rates and each program's rates in 2009. Medicaid physician-payment rates vary extensively from state to state, averaging 72% of those of Medicare in 2008. 7 The uncertainty over whether these sharply higher rates will continue after 2014 is likely to weigh on physicians who are contemplating opening their practices to more Medicaid patients.
Will other payers follow these Medicare changes? Given the degree to which private insurers and health policy report
Medicaid programs have tied their payment decisions to Medicare's RBRVS, it is likely that Medicare policy changes embedded in the relativevalue scale will be incorporated. This likelihood is tempered by the fact that specialists tend to have more leverage to negotiate higher percentages of Medicare rates than primary care physicians. Policies outside the RBRVS, such as Medicare's 10% bonus for primary care services provided by primary care physicians, will have a more uncertain influence on other payers. However, both private insurers and Medicaid programs do have concerns about the supply of primary care physicians, so this step by Medicare could be an opening for private payers to make similar changes.
Physician -Payment Reform
Increasing the accuracy of the MPFS is only the start of initiatives to reform the physician-payment system. Under the ACA, two distinct strategies are called for, each with the goal of broadening the unit of payment beyond fee for service and incorporating quality into the payment system. One strategy expands existing initiatives for Medicare value-based purchasing. The second strategy authorizes extensive experimentation with initiatives -such as bundled payments and accountable care organizations -that would broaden the unit of payment. Setting the stage for the first strategy, the Physician Quality Reporting Initiative was extended through 2014 and becomes mandatory in 2015. Payment rates for physicians who do not report will be reduced by 1.5% in 2015 and by 2.0% in subsequent years. The physician-feedback program will be strengthened, in part through the development of a transparent episode grouper (i.e., a publicly accessible algorithm that sorts claims into those connected with an episode of care and those that are unrelated), with endorsement by the National Quality Forum to be sought. Beginning in 2012, physician feedback will be based on episodes of care and will include adjustments for patient demographic characteristics and health status. Only aggregate reports on physicians will be made available to the public.
Building on these foundations, Medicare will implement a value-based modifier -an adjustment to payment rates under the physician fee schedule based on how quality compares with costs. Using data developed for the physicianfeedback program, the CMS will establish a composite of risk-based measures of quality that reflect health outcomes and the health status of beneficiaries. A parallel composite of appropriate measures of costs will be developed, including the episode-based measures mentioned above. The value-based modifiers are to be applied to specific physicians or groups selected by the program beginning in 2015 and to all physicians and groups beginning in 2017.
This value-based purchasing approach has some resemblance to high-performance network approaches implemented by some health insurers. The Medicare approach appears to address many of the problems that physicians have had with private-insurer approaches through greater emphasis on transparency of methods, involvement of physicians in the development of these methods, and risk adjustment of both quality and cost measures. However, the reward for better value in Medicare will be higher payment rates, rather than steering patients to physicians with better value. Medicare's efforts will probably have profound effects on how private insurers measure value, if only because of greater provider acceptance; this could influence both pay-forperformance initiatives and network strategies.
While Medicare will be developing value-based purchasing, the ACA authorizes an extensive program of experimentation with other approaches to reform provider payment. The essence of this track is to shift payment to broader units of service, such as an episode of care or even a person's care needs over a period of time, and to incorporate quality of care into provider payment. Reflecting the lack of experience with approaches championed by policy experts and a lack of consensus concerning which approaches are the most promising, the strategy can best be described as delegating substantial authority to the CMS to develop, pilot, and implement various approaches.
A central part of this initiative is the establishment of a Center for Medicare and Medicaid Innovation within the CMS. It is directed to test innovative payment and service-delivery models to reduce program expenditures while preserving or enhancing quality of care. The legislation mentions 20 possible models for testing, with flexibility to pursue other models as well. It also provides the opportunity for the secretary of health and human services to expand the duration and scope of a model, including national implementation.
The ACA mandates a national voluntary pilot For accountable care organizations, the legislation goes further than pilot programs. The secretary is simply authorized to contract with these organizations, which are defined in the ACA as specified groups of providers and suppliers who have an established mechanism for shared governance, including partnerships or joint venture arrangements between hospitals and (accountable care organization) professionals. The accountable care organization becomes responsible for the quality, cost, and overall care of the Medicare feefor-service beneficiaries attributed to it. The organization must achieve a certain minimum level of savings before savings are shared. In addition to payment to accountable care organizations on a fee-for-service basis with shared savings, the secretary has the authority to use partial capitation or other payment methods.
This approach of the testing or implementation of a wide range of avenues to provider payment by granting substantial authority to the secretary is in striking contrast to the approach by Congress in recent decades. Under the latter approach, demonstrations of new payment methods were highly constrained in duration and by a requirement that each one not increase spending. If a demonstration appeared to be successful, all the Department of Health and Human Services could do was make recommendations to Congress, many of which were not acted on. In contrast, the ACA provides much greater authority to the department, including the potential of national implementation of successful pilot programs without additional congressional permission, and it allows a wide range of designs to be pursued. Funding for these initiatives is also substantial, with a direct appropriation for the work of the Center for Medicare and Medicaid Innovation of $10 billion over 10 years.
Many policy experts believe that the reform of payment methods for physicians and other providers is the most promising method of improving the quality of care and controlling costs. The ACA may launch an era of large-scale development of payment methods that incorporate quality and broaden incentives to episodes of care and all services required by patients over a period of time. The outcomes of these efforts are uncertain, but, finally, much stronger initiatives will be pursued. Nevertheless, Congress has still not addressed the prospect of sudden sharp reductions in payment rates due to the SGR. To some people, fixing the SGR would seem easier than reforms of payment methods. But in the political world it is not. 
